

THE LOW COUNTRIES, 1750-2000

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1. Ownership, power relations and the distribution of property

Types of landowners

After 1750 four main types of non-farmer landowners can be distinguished in the Low Countries: ecclesiastical institutions; investors in land (those who buy, own and sell land for profit); (noble) landowners who have inherited their land and aimed to pass it on to their offspring and government, both regional and local and public institutions. Farmers with full property rights (owner-occupiers) also controlled substantial proportions of the countryside although the proportion varied from area to area.

After the Reformation the provincial, local and urban governments in the Northern Netherlands became large landowners. The estates of Catholic churches and monasteries were expropriated, although many Catholic charities, like orphanages, were allowed to retain their endowments. As a result the provincial governments became major landowners. For instance, until the 1760s, the provincial government of Groningen was the owner of about 25,000 hectares in the province.

In the western provinces of the Northern Netherlands many large landowners belonged to the urban elite. Rich inhabitants of the capital of Zeeland, Middelburg, owned a great deal of land on the isle of Walcheren, but they had also invested heavily in large reclamation projects in other parts of the province. These urban landowners viewed their land in a more business-like fashion than the noble landowners in the east of the country, regarding it more as an investment which could be liquidated when necessary. In the nineteenth century many investors from Belgium and France bought land in Zeeland, but in the twentieth century, especially in the second half, the investor in agricultural land was less important than before.

Much land in the provinces of Friesland, Overijssel and Gelderland was in the hands of members of the old rural nobility. Some families had possessed their land for centuries. In the delta area of the Rhine, Meuse and Waal rivers in Gelderland they owned almost half of the land in the eighteenth century, but the ownership of unbroken land per family was limited {meaning? What is unbroken?}. In the Graafschap, situated in the eastern and sandy part of the province of Gelderland, some

34 noble families owned more than 1,000 hectares unbroken land, but most real estates
35 were no larger than 300 hectares. Some rural estates survive through to today, but it
36 has been very difficult for them to keep their heads above water, because rent yields
37 were relatively low over the late twentieth century.

38 {I think we should have more here on the extent of government ownership in
39 the 19th C.} The role of the government as landowner continued through the twentieth
40 century, but its main task became the protection of nature. In this context a new type
41 of landowner came to the fore: (private) nature and landscape conservancy
42 organizations, who now own a great deal of agricultural land (Priester, 1991; Brusse,
43 1999; Van Cruyningen, 2005; Van Cruyningen, 2006).

44 {What about owner-occupation in the Netherlands. Can we have a table to
45 show this distribution of land?}

46 In pre-Revolutionary eighteenth-century *Southern Netherlands*, the
47 ecclesiastical institutions and the nobility owned about 25 to 50 per cent of the land.
48 Most big domains were in hands of the Church. Urban investors controlled about 10
49 to 15 per cent of the land, with highest proportions in the more densely populated
50 regions in Flanders. Fifty to 65 per cent of the land was owned by its occupiers or was
51 common land controlled locally. This ratio was higher in the south and the east of the
52 country. The sale of the *biens nationaux* around 1800 affected mainly the
53 ecclesiastical lands, most of whose land was acquired by members of the old and new
54 (industrial) bourgeoisie. Local farmers {occupiers?} only managed to secure between
55 10 and 23 per cent of the land depending on the region (Vandenbroeke, 1979). These
56 sales promoted the tendencies to the concentration of property and the subdivision of
57 the large ecclesiastical estates {contradictory?}.

58 In mid-nineteenth century Belgium more than 80 per cent of all landed
59 property was in private hands with public institutions controlling between 15 and 20
60 per cent. After 1850, the share of public property diminished {why?}. The property in
61 private hands was extremely subdivided. On average, a cadastral property title
62 measured only three ha. in mid-century, shrinking by the end of the century to two ha.
63 In 1845 almost six of ten households had at least one property title in the Cadastre. In
64 1910 the proportion was only 41 per cent, but had risen slightly to 43 per cent in
65 1930. From this time onwards the number of households with landed property rose
66 again. The number of large estates was largely stable in the nineteenth century, about
67 1750 landowners having more than 100 ha each. Around 1900 only 146 families

68 owned more than 1000 hectares, the two biggest ones having in total 12,800 hectares.
69 However, proprietors with more than 50 hectares, no more than one per cent of the
70 total number, controlled half of the land. The 70 per cent of small landowners (with
71 less than one hectare) possessed only five per cent of the total land area. Still, in 1900
72 69 per cent of all proprietors had less than one hectare of land, 95 per cent less than
73 five hectares. Until at least the inter-war years, the number and proportion of large
74 properties diminished significantly, a consequence of the equality of inheritance,
75 demographic growth and taxation.

76

77 *Changing social property distribution*

78 A snapshot around 1900 shows significant regional differences in the position of land
79 holding in the Low Countries. In the south (Belgium), leaseholding was dominant.
80 Almost three quarters of the cultivated land and more than half of all agricultural
81 holdings were held and cultivated on lease (Vanhaute, 2001). The highest proportion
82 of land held on lease could be found in Inner Flanders and between Antwerp and
83 Brussels (up to 80 or 90 per cent of farms and farm land). Low proportions
84 characterised the Campine region in the provinces of Antwerp and Limburg and in the
85 Ardennes (40 per cent and lower of farms and farm land). In the north (The
86 Netherlands) owner-occupiers held about 53 per cent of agricultural land at the
87 beginning of the twentieth century. High proportions of property holding {owner-
88 occupation} were found in the north-east (Groningen, Overijssel) where up to 70 per
89 cent of the land used for arable, grazing or horticultural purposes was owned the
90 farmers who cultivated it. Elsewhere in the country, the percent of land held by
91 owner-occupiers was much lower, with values of 26 or 27 per cent in Zeeland and
92 Friesland.

93 The balance between owner-occupation and tenancy changed considerably in
94 the centuries before 1900, and continued to change thereafter. In Flanders, the former
95 Duchy of Flanders in the sixteenth century for example, half of the land and the farms
96 were owned by the farmers themselves. This ratio was reduced to one third in the
97 eighteenth century and less than 20 per cent (and locally often less than 10 per cent)
98 after 1850. Between 1846 and 1895, the number of smallholdings of less than one
99 hectare mainly or completely held on lease doubled. This trend was accompanied by a
100 process of proletarianization. In 1850 almost six of every ten families in *Belgium*
101 owned land. In 1910, this was only four of ten families (Vanhaute, 2001). In the

102 regions with high proportions of leasehold, the beginning of the twentieth century
103 marked a turn in a secular trend of decline of peasant land property. This was most
104 pronounced in the case of small family plots less than one hectare. In 1950 55 per cent
105 of them were held in owner-occupation where farms larger than one hectare still were
106 exploited mainly or completely on lease. That is why in Belgium the overall share of
107 leasehold remained at a high of 65 per cent. Around 1950 the regional differences still
108 reflected the historic distribution of owner-occupation: a predominance of leasehold
109 in the Polders, the sandy and sandy-loam regions up to the Condroz (75 per cent and
110 more), against less than 50 per cent in the Campine and the Ardennes regions. Leases
111 were normally limited to terms of three to nine years, but in densely populated areas
112 of Flanders, annual verbal agreements for potato plots, pasture and even for arable
113 land were not exceptional. The distinction between owner-occupation and tenancy
114 narrowed with the improved statutory protection of leasehold, guaranteeing rents of
115 at least nine years {fixed for none years?} (first law voted in 1929 {was it passed in
116 1929?}, adapted {amended?} in 1951, 1969 and 1988) (Segers and Van Molle, 2004).

117 Eighteenth-century regional patterns of landownership among farmers in the
118 Northern Netherlands were different. In contrast with the southern regions, individual
119 property holding increased. In Over-Betuwe, in the river region of the province of
120 Gelderland, this development began shortly after 1700. A comparable development
121 can be observed in Zeeland; although in some districts, the trend started before 1740.
122 In the Salland region of Overijssel, it seems that the only purchasers of farm estates
123 after 1750 were farmers, which meant that the proportion of leased land fell and that
124 of owner-occupied land increased. The same process can be observed in Friesland
125 and Groningen although the changes took effect much more rapidly in the latter than
126 the former. The turning point and speed of change differed to some extent, but the
127 general tendency was the same. In the nineteenth century, the trend was reversed,
128 although the developments in this period are less well documented. It seems that after
129 1817 developments in all parts of the Northern Netherlands {exactly what are they?}
130 ran in parallel. Between 1884 and 1910, the numbers of landowning farmers grew less
131 rapidly than those of the leaseholders. In 1910, an average of 53 per cent of the land
132 in the Netherlands was being farmed by its owners. Thereafter, the proportion of the
133 land owned by farmers decreased in most provinces and by 1950, 44 per cent of
134 Dutch agricultural land was in owner-occupation. {But was buying this land?} In the
135 second half of the twentieth century, ownership by farmers in the Netherlands

136 increased again as a result of the Agricultural Holdings Act of 1958 which made the
137 leasing of land much less profitable. In 1959 more than half of agricultural land was
138 rented by farmers: by 2004 this had fallen to 29 per cent (Priester, 1991; Priester,
139 1998; Van Zanden, 1984; Brusse, 1999).

140

141 *Systems of tenure*

142 Systems of tenure also varied regionally and can be directly related to the prevailing
143 regional agro-system. In the clay and more market-oriented areas, relations between
144 leaseholders and landowners were businesslike. Rent was usually paid in cash.
145 Leasehold relations in these areas were rather flexible, because the continuity of the
146 lease was in the interest of both parties. In times of falling rentals, for example
147 between 1650 and 1750, landowners made many concessions to their leaseholders. In
148 more favourable times, like the period between 1750 and 1817 it was the other way
149 around. In depressed times many farmers and smallholders preferred to rent their
150 farms because this way the risks of agriculture could be shared. On the other hand, in
151 times of economic upswing, it was advantageous for farmers to buy their land because
152 landlords did not hesitate to raise the rents. However renting a farm was accepted as
153 normal in market-oriented regions. Some tenants on the clay land of Zeeland and
154 Gelderland were renting huge farms and counted amongst the leading figures in their
155 villages. In some commercialized regions the tenure system retained some traditional
156 features. The government was the largest landowner in the clay area in Groningen, but
157 completely failed to exploit its rights over its tenants. Here farmers were able to
158 strengthen their hold on the land they rented through the so-called *beklemrecht*, a
159 special type of hereditary leasehold which gave them the perpetual right to lease the
160 land (Priester, 1991; Brusse, 1999)

161 On the sandy soils landlord-tenant relationships were often more paternalistic.
162 In some regions the landlord expected to be the godfather of the tenants children. The
163 sons of the tenant in Overijssel were expected to introduce their brides to their father's
164 landlord {for approval?} (Van Cruyningen, 2005). In other regions tenure systems
165 were part of village-based credit networks. The bigger farms exchanged their capital
166 surplus (horses, equipment) for labour surpluses on the smaller, often rented holdings.
167 In many peasant-like regions, this dense system of credit and exchange served to keep
168 rents low. Rents themselves were part of the credit relations and could be reduced or
169 postponed in depressed conditions.

170 Nonetheless, land prices rose sharply in both Belgium and the Netherlands in
 171 the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In densely populated regions with a high
 172 proportion of smallholdings, the competition for land was most intense. In Inner
 173 Flanders between the middle of the eighteenth century and the third quarter of the
 174 nineteenth, the real price (expressed in labour days) of one ha of arable land increased
 175 three-fold (to more than 90 days' wages). This rise reflected also a changing balance
 176 of power between farmers, landholders and the state. While in Flanders, the nominal
 177 value of land taxes hardly changed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, we
 178 notice a sharp increase in the value of land rents (Vanhaute, 2001). In other words, the
 179 productivity gains which were made in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Flemish
 180 agriculture were entirely expropriated by private landowners. The direct capital
 181 {income?} transfer from agriculture towards private owners via rents can be estimated
 182 at 10-15 per cent {of the capital invested?} in the third quarter of the eighteenth
 183 century and 20-25 per cent in the nineteenth. Net yearly profits of landowners can be
 184 estimated {at a return of 3.5 per cent on capital} before 1880 and 4.5 per cent after
 185 1895. {Do I understand this right?}

186 In some sandy-soil regions such as Gelderland and Overijssel, *métayage*
 187 remained common practice until the early nineteenth century. Until then more than 90
 188 per cent of the arable land of the Veluwe was leased under this system (Roessingh,
 189 1969). Leaseholders had to pay rent in kind, up to half of the harvest. The landowner
 190 sold this on the city market {which city?}. In this system the landowners often
 191 contributed to the variable costs, by supplying seed and manure.

192 The balance of power in the relationship between lessor and leaseholder,
 193 preconfigured {?} these regional differences. In the river-clay regions such as
 194 Gelderland, the rent was largely determined by the market and the market in tenancies
 195 was free and open. Every six years, farms were re-leased and farmers had to compete
 196 to secure a tenancy for a further term. The relationship between lessor and lessee was
 197 purely a business one. That is why rents increased around three times on average
 198 between the second half of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth
 199 century, in some cases as much as five times. On the clay soils of Overijssel where the
 200 leasing situation was just as business-like, rents also rocketed (Van Zanden, 1984;
 201 Brusse, 1999). In such eastern sandy areas as Overijssel, Gelderland and the Campine
 202 region, the position of leaseholders was stronger. Over time the landowners, whose
 203 attitude was, as was explained before, more paternalistic, had conceded excessive

204 privileges to the leaseholders who usually managed to prevent agricultural surpluses
205 being skimmed off, with the result that rents between 1770 and 1810 only rose by an
206 average of 50 per cent. This was, as we noticed, very different to the densely
207 populated proto-industrial region of Inner-Flanders, where the competition over land
208 pushed prices upwards between 1750 and 1870.

209 In the eighteenth century, those who farmed the clay soils of Groningen had
210 increased their hold on the land because of the *beklemrecht*. When, around 1770,
211 investors bought this land hoping to profit from the rising agricultural prices, the
212 rights of the leaseholders were confirmed by means of legal action. Consequently
213 investors did not make much profit on their investment. By contrast, farmers profited
214 from the agricultural boom, strengthening their social position in the nineteenth
215 century. In the second half of the twentieth century the position of all farmers in the
216 Netherlands and Belgium who rented their land and farm was strengthened by
217 successive Agricultural Holdings Acts, of which the first ones were brought into force
218 in 1929 (Belgium) and 1938 (The Netherlands).

219

220 *The economic value of land*

221 In general, the economic value of farming land in the Low Countries was determined
222 by market forces and by the mechanism of supply and demand. The level of rents and
223 sale prices started to fall in the middle of the seventeenth century and continued at
224 depressed levels until around 1750. By then land prices had started to rise, sharply so
225 after 1800. Shortly after 1815, a peak was reached, followed by a sharp but temporary
226 fall in rent levels. They subsequently rose again from 1825 until around 1875. The
227 second half of the 1870s marked a new turning point, because the rent started to drop
228 again and continued to do so for about two decades. Between 1895 and approximately
229 1925, rent levels rose, but in the second half of the 1920s and especially in the first
230 half of the 1930s, they took a turn for the worse. Prices began to rise again from
231 around 1935. In the second half of the twentieth century prices of land were rising in
232 response to an increasing scarcity of land. However in that period rent and sale prices
233 in the Netherlands were held below market levels, because all leases and property
234 transactions were regulated by the so-called *grondkamer* (Land Tenure Control Board
235 {when was this established?}) (Van Zanden, 1985; Brusse, 1999; Priester, 1998; Van
236 der Bie en Smits, 2001; Knibbe, 2006)

237 So, after 1750, the economic value of land was increasing because the demand
238 for land was growing in response to rising demands for agricultural products. In the
239 delta of the rivers Rhine, Waal and Meuse in Gelderland, the increase in the amount
240 of land owned by farmers at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth
241 centuries was regarded by contemporaries as being the outcome of favourable
242 economic developments. Many farmers did borrow large amounts of money in order
243 to purchase their farms. Motivations to buy or sell land could differ between regions
244 and period. Many farmers in the Dutch river region in the late eighteenth and early
245 nineteenth century choose to purchase land because the rents rose faster than wheat
246 prices, the main crop in this area. It is likely that farmers in Zeeland could buy land
247 for relatively low prices, because urban landowners were in a desperate need for
248 money as a result of the collapse of the urban economy after 1795. In the sandy area
249 of the province of Overijssel, the farmers became landowners for the opposite reason:
250 that the rise of rents lagged behind farmers' income. It was therefore a logical step for
251 the landowners to sell their land because farmers (in anticipation of future profits)
252 were prepared to pay high prices for the freehold. When the land prices started to fall
253 after 1817, some of them were forced to resell because of accumulated arrears of
254 mortgage payments. The same upswing in sale and resale activity can be seen in other
255 commercial regions such as Friesland and in Zeeland after 1878. In the twentieth
256 century, especially in the second half, the economic value of land was determined by
257 factors other than the profitability of agriculture. Land became scarce because of the
258 population growth and urban development (Van Zanden, 1984; Wintle, 1986; Priester,
259 1998; Brusse, 1999, Brusse 2009).

260

261 *The cultural and political value of land*

262 The cultural and political value of land differed between social groups and region.
263 Until the end of the eighteenth century, political power in the Dutch province of
264 Friesland was directly connected to the possession of certain parcels of land. This was
265 not the case in other provinces, but the ownership of land conferred social prestige
266 and therefore political power everywhere in the Netherlands. Until 1795 the most
267 important administrator in the district of Over-Betuwe (eastern river clay area), i.e.
268 the *ambtman*, was always a noble man and large landowner. On the isle of Walcheren,
269 urban owners of rural land wielded the most political power in the countryside,
270 although their power was in fact based on the possession of so-called *ambachten*. In

271 Holland the administration of the water board districts was in the hands of large
272 landowners (Brusse, 1999; Faber, 1972; Stol 2002).

273 In the nineteenth century, both in Belgium and the Netherlands, the right to
274 vote for and to be elected to a public administrative body was to a large extent based
275 on the amount of land tax that one paid. The Belgian nineteenth-century Senate
276 reflected the enduring power of noble and bourgeois landowners. Only the 400 to 600
277 highest tax payers (in majority {?} land taxes) were eligible {to sit in, or to vote
278 for?}for the upper chamber. Forty-three per cent of its seats were held by the ‘new’
279 bourgeoisie in 1842 and 92 per cent in 1892. Many industrial families, such as the
280 Ghent textile manufacturers, invested heavily in land, both for financial security but
281 also to secure prestige and areas of refuge {acquire the trappings of the rural
282 lifestyle?} (De Belder, 1977). In the Netherlands between 1848 and 1887, only a very
283 small group of male tax payers was eligible for Parliament. In Gelderland for
284 example, although one of the most populated province of the country, only 144 were
285 eligible in 1875, most of whom were large landowners.

286 At the local level, most mayors (elected in Belgium, appointed in the
287 Netherlands) had an additional income from land. Although farmers were not without
288 political influence in the eighteenth century, they had to wait until after the
289 administrative reforms of the nineteenth century before their possession of land gave
290 them the opportunity to hold the more important local administrative positions. After
291 the abolition of the census suffrage {explain, or say ‘widening of the franchise’} in
292 1887 in the Netherlands and in 1893 in Belgium, other social groups were able to
293 secure political power. But throughout the first half of the twentieth century farmers
294 are found running the local administration in the countryside. They were
295 disproportionately represented in municipal councils and many served as alderman.
296 However from the 1960s onwards, as agriculture became a marginal economic sector,
297 farmers lost their political power again (Munters, 1989).

298

299

300 **2. The occupiers of land**

301 *Peasant ownership of land and the changing size of holdings*

302 About 1900, the English sociologist avant-la-lettre B.H. Seebohm Rowntree described
303 Belgium as *un pays de petites exploitations*.¹. This fragmentation of agricultural land
304 into many small holdings was the outcome of an age-old process which only
305 culminated in the first part of the twentieth century. Around 1850 55 per cent of all
306 farms in Belgium were smaller than one hectare. In 1900 this had increased to 66 per
307 cent and by 1950 75 per cent. Most of these holdings were transformed into vegetable
308 gardens for working families living in the countryside but working in nearby towns. It
309 was only in the 1960s that the average area of the farm started to rise significantly.
310 The mixed, market-oriented family holding, exploiting on average 7 to 10 hectares
311 became the standard farm in the 1960s and 1970s. The typical farm consisted of three
312 ha in 1950, 11.5 ha in 1980 and 22 ha in 2000 (Segers and Van Molle, 2004). Again,
313 there were substantial regional differences. In the nineteenth century, in the sandy and
314 sandy-loam regions in Inner Flanders and Hainault, more than three quarters of the
315 holdings were smaller than one hectare, against less than 40 per cent in Limburg
316 Campine and the Luxembourg Ardennes. The typical region of small peasant farming
317 was the old Duchy of Flanders (the provinces of East- and West-Flanders), until the
318 early nineteenth century the most prosperous and most populated region of the
319 Southern Netherlands. These very small leaseholds of less the one to two hectares,
320 which were mostly too small to sustain a family for a whole year, were the outcome
321 of a very long-term, secular process. The fragmentation and expropriation of the
322 Flemish farm started in the ‘long thirteenth century’, accelerated in the ‘long sixteenth
323 century’ and culminated in the ‘long nineteenth century’. About 30 to 40 per cent of
324 all farms in Inner Flanders in the second half of the sixteenth century were smaller
325 than a hectare, a ratio that had doubled by the nineteenth century. Commercial farms
326 of 10 hectares and more were characteristic of the clay regions in the sea and river
327 polders (coast and the Schelde river district) and in the loamy region south of
328 Brussels. However even the smallest village had its *coqs du village*, bigger farmers
329 who had a central role in the local rural economy. Over time, their number remained
330 surprisingly stable, a legacy of the old, village-based agro-system (Thoen, 2001).
331 The information about farm size in the *Northern Netherlands* between 1750
332 and 1880 is more impressionistic, but it seems that in the eighteenth century and
333 perhaps in the first half of the nineteenth century the average size of farms was

¹ B. H. Seebohm Rowntree, *Comment diminuer la misère en Belgique* (Paris., 1910), p. 00.

334 increasing in the alluvial parts of the Netherlands, a continuation of much earlier
335 trends. However, in the north-eastern sandy regions, especially in Drenthe, the
336 smallholding definitely won ground, although in Salland (Overijssel), also situated in
337 the east, the number of large farms grew relatively quickly. In the eastern part of the
338 river clay area, the growth of employment in agriculture was determined by the rise of
339 smallholders, many of them farming tobacco.

340 The period from about 1850 or perhaps 1880 through to around 1930 can be
341 considered as the golden age of the Dutch smallholder. Throughout the Netherlands,
342 the number of farms of 1-5 ha grew rapidly. Between 1878 and 1910 their number
343 rose with 64 per cent, while the total number of farms increased only by 39 per cent.
344 In the province of Drenthe the number of smallholders doubled. In 1910 more than
345 half of the farmers had less than 5 ha a piece and almost 90 per cent had less than 20
346 ha {are these figures for Drenthe only?}(Van Zanden, 1984, 1985; Bieleman, 1987;
347 Priester, 1998; Brusse, 1999).

348 In contrast, until the second half of the twentieth century, Belgium remained
349 predominantly a land of small family farms, many of whom adopted horticulture.
350 Between the middle of the nineteenth and the middle of the twentieth century the total
351 number of farms more than doubled. Nevertheless the contribution of agriculture to
352 average household income started to decline in this period. In the middle of the
353 nineteenth century, the number of farms was 65 per cent of the number of families.
354 This fell to about 50 per cent around 1900 to a mere 35 per cent in 1950. If we take
355 one hectare as a lower limit, in 1850 29 per cent of all Belgian families exploited a
356 family farm. In 1900 this had fallen to 18 per cent and in 1950 less than 10 per cent
357 were agricultural households.

358 Large holdings of more than 10 ha lost ground between 1850 and 1950, from
359 16 to 9 per cent of the agricultural land, although the numbers of these farms
360 remained remarkably stable at around 45-46,000. After 1950, the distribution of land
361 changed quickly: in 2000 75 per cent of the remaining farms were bigger than 10 ha,
362 against only 28 per cent half a century earlier.

363 From 1930 onwards small farmers in The Netherlands increasingly ran into
364 difficulties and after 1950 the number of smallholders decreased quickly, while the
365 number of farmers with more than 20 hectares in cultivation rose. Between 1950 and
366 2000 the total number of farms fell from 338,500 to 97,500. In 2000 less than a
367 quarter of the farmers had only 1-5 ha in use. The increase in scale in Dutch

368 agriculture is also shown by the considerable rise of the number of dairy cattle per
369 farm. In the early 1950s, an average of about seven cows were kept on a medium-
370 sized dairy farm, but by 1995 a medium-sized dairy farm counted more than 45 cows
371 (Bieleman, 2010). In Belgium, the number of commercial farms {definition?} fell by
372 75 per cent between 1950 and 2000. The biggest part of Belgium's farmland - roughly
373 80 to 85 per cent - is now exploited by farms of between 10 and 50 hectares. The
374 large majority of smallholdings cover only 4 to 7 per cent of the land area.

375

376 *The disappearance of communal land use systems*

377 Communal land use systems existed in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Low
378 Countries only in the eastern (sandy) and southern (forest) parts. Common land and
379 common use rights were regulated and protected by village institutions, as a rule
380 through a strict set of ordinances. Access and use were restricted to villagers. In
381 forested areas in the south, the usage of a yearly rotating system of de- and re-
382 forestation commonly survived well in the twentieth century. In Belgium, French
383 communal law confirmed these public property rights by appointing the local
384 authorities as sole proprietor of these lands. In the eastern provinces of the
385 Netherlands so-called *markegenootschappen* - which that laid down rules for the use
386 of uncultivated ground - were entrusted with the management of this land. The main
387 aim was to keep it for grazing cattle and for producing fertiliser {how?}. All
388 landowners (including smallholders, farmers and noble landowners) in the villages in
389 the neighbourhood of the *marken* were represented in these organizations, but the
390 largest landowners had many more votes than the smallholders.

391 The first publicly-sponsored attempts at a general privatisation and division of
392 common lands in Belgium in the second half of the eighteenth century were not
393 successful. At that time about 40 per cent – perhaps 400,000 ha - of agricultural land
394 was waste or forested, the larger part exploited as common land. Local resistance to
395 division weakened in the nineteenth century, and after the general law for the
396 reclamation of uncultivated lands of 1847, village authorities sold their common lands
397 with increasing speed. In 1910 only 100,000 hectares of 'vague' lands were left. The
398 main instigators behind this process were the larger (often, but not always, urban)
399 landowners, who wanted their share of these areas of land. At the beginning of the
400 nineteenth century, the Dutch government made the first move towards carrying out
401 this requirement {meaning} but there was still much resistance to partitioning. It was

402 only when it was considered to have become economically advantageous that farmers
403 cooperated. In the period 1820-60 the country, especially the province of Overijssel
404 experienced a hausse {in English?} in these activities and the land was rapidly
405 divided. The Enclosure Act of 1886, which ordained that any member of a
406 *markgenootschap* could demand its division, stimulated further inland clearances. In
407 general, the large landowners and larger farmers profited the most from these
408 enclosures. It had the effect of increasing social polarisation within the rural society.
409 In the first half of the twentieth century the last communal land in the Low Countries
410 disappeared, except some forested areas in the Ardennes (Van Zanden, 1984, 1985;
411 Demoed, 1987, Van Cruyningen, 2005)

412

413 *Power in the villages*

414 During the nineteenth century and to a lesser degree in the twentieth, it was the
415 owners of large landed properties who exercised power in the countryside of both the
416 Northern and the Southern Netherlands. Their ownership of property was also
417 acknowledged because payment of the land tax was linked to the franchise until the
418 late nineteenth century. At this date in Belgium, the most influential people in rural
419 villages were often the local nobility and *nouveau riches* from the new industrial
420 bourgeoisie who built chateaux in the countryside, the ‘intellectual elite’ at village
421 level, including the parish priest, the superior of a convent or monastery, the notary
422 (should there be one) and the schoolmaster, and, of course, the biggest farmers. The
423 polder villages and the *markgenootschappen* of the northern Netherlands were both
424 dominated by the established farmers and larger landowners. In both countries it was
425 not unusual for members of the same family to retain dominant positions in local
426 politics and administration over several decades. The political opinion of the most
427 influential villagers often determined the political ‘colour’ of the village: Catholic,
428 Liberal or indefinable in nineteenth-century Belgium, with a clear preference for
429 Catholic parties in Flanders and Liberal parties in Wallonia (de Smaele, 2009). In a
430 number of small Belgian villages this meant that municipal elections never held
431 because there was only one list of candidates, those of the mayor and his followers.
432 The relatively immobile status of remote villages made them immune from the
433 sometimes heated political discussions at the national level, such as the attempt to
434 introduce a ‘monastery bill’ in Belgium in 1856, which would have facilitated gifts
435 and legacies for poor relief to religious institutions, and the ‘school war’ between

436 Liberals and Catholics (1878-84). The attempts of the Belgian socialist party before
437 the First World War to gain support in the countryside remained practically fruitless
438 (Van Molle, 1989).

439 Rural municipalities were self-governing with a framework of provincial and
440 national regulations and laws. The powers of the local administrations extended to
441 matters such as the organization of poor relief via a public *Bureau de Bienfaisance*
442 (charity office, compulsory since the French Revolution), the public school (at least
443 one public primary school per municipality was compulsory in Belgium from 1879
444 onwards), public order (the rural policeman), safety and health (including the fight
445 against contagious cattle diseases) and the construction and maintenance of local
446 roads. The rural elites worked hard – both for ease of personal travel but also for
447 access to agricultural markets - to secure their own railway station or at least a
448 tramway connection. In 1890 Belgium had the densest railway network in Europe:
449 15.9 km per 100 km², followed by another 12.4 km per 100 km² of tramways by 1910.
450 This efficient transport infrastructure curbed the so-called ‘rural exodus’ and
451 encouraged commuting. But because of the frequent contacts between the rural and
452 the urban world, comfort norms changed rapidly. After World War I, local politicians
453 felt the need to provide new public services, often via the foundation of jointly-owned
454 municipal enterprises: water supply, a sewer system, electricity, gas distribution,
455 telephone etc., followed after the Second World War by bus connections, sports
456 infrastructure, public libraries and cultural centres. Local authorities competed with
457 each other in order to increase their prestige and become the most modern and most
458 beautiful village of the region. This modernization process was encouraged by the
459 Belgian government, for instance by the *Commission nationale pour l’embellissement*
460 *de la vie rurale* (National Committee for the Betterment of the Countryside), that
461 functioned from 1905 to the 1950s.

462 Meanwhile power relations in the countryside had started to change both in
463 Belgium and the Netherlands. The introduction of universal male suffrage at the end
464 of the nineteenth century and the women’s vote (in the Netherlands in 1922, in
465 Belgium first at municipal level in 1921 and at national level in 1948), the increasing
466 literacy of the masses and the rising degree of organization among farmers and
467 workers in unions and other forms of association all contributed to heightened self-
468 awareness. Leaders of the local branches of the farmers’ unions at village level soon
469 became an influential part of the local social and political elite (Bax and Nieuwenhuis,

470 1981). Power relations changed once again after the Second World War when
471 sprawling suburbs and the construction of new residential areas in the countryside
472 multiplied the influence of newcomers. In Belgium this process was fuelled by the so-
473 called De Taeye act{in English?} (1948) which provided subsidies for building
474 houses for families with children as a means of reducing the acute shortage of
475 housing. Numerous municipal administrations seized the opportunity to attract new
476 inhabitants by putting building land at the disposal of social housing companies and
477 individuals. By doing so, they reversed the pattern of migration from the countryside:
478 it was urban centres in densely populated Flanders which in the 1950s and 1960s
479 which witnessed a net loss of inhabitants, whereas villages saw their population grow.
480 The expansion of villages with new housing provoked hostility and tensions between
481 ‘natives’ and newcomers. In combination with the diminishing number of farming
482 people, the countryside became a zone of mixed ‘cohabitation’. The process of
483 ‘counter urbanisation’ also meant that cities had to cope with shrinking tax incomes,
484 the degradation of their housing stock and a decreasing attractiveness for retailers who
485 preferred to settle in new shopping centres in the vicinity of the new housing areas in
486 the countryside. It is in this context that the successive mergers of Belgian
487 municipalities, whose numbers fell from 2670 in 1964 to 589 in 1983 must be
488 understood: it was a way to reduce costs and increase tax revenues from a larger
489 population base. Comparable developments took place in the Netherlands. The
490 number of municipalities decreased from 1250 in 1819 to 537 in 2000 (declining
491 steadily from 1900 onwards with an acceleration since 1965 {can we have a figure for
492 1965?} (van der Meer, 2006). The loss of local autonomy to the larger municipalities
493 into which they were merged was not welcomed by the majority of the villages.

494

495 *Peasant organizations*

496 From the second half of the eighteenth century, and in parallel with demographic
497 growth and pressure on the food supply, the interest of the elites in farming increased.
498 The first agricultural societies, founded earlier in the Northern than in the Southern
499 Netherlands, sought to bring about progress by experiment, and through publications
500 and lectures. Their sphere of action was local or regional and their membership
501 limited to well-to-do aristocrats and large landowners, politicians and scientists. The
502 Low Countries, in the same way as the United Kingdom and France, became gripped
503 by a real ‘agromania’. Under French rule, during period of the United Kingdom of the

504 Netherlands (1815-1830) and then, after the separation of north and south, the number
505 of prestigious agricultural and horticultural societies continued to grow. Some had a
506 semi-public status as royal or provincial agricultural associations or regional *comices*
507 *agricoles*. But a wide gap remained between these rather elitist initiatives and the day-
508 to-day practice of the mass of smallholders.

509 The organization of these smallholders started in earnest in the later nineteenth
510 century in the context of the agrarian crisis. The elitist agricultural societies were
511 unable to meet the needs of the farmers who struggled with falling market prices.
512 New types of farmers' organizations succeeded in filling the gap: firstly small-scale
513 cooperatives for the purchase of fertilizers and livestock feed, savings and loan
514 cooperatives and cooperative dairy farms, plus mutual insurance for cattle loss;
515 secondly farmers' unions on the model of the German *Bauernvereine*. The farmers'
516 unions presented themselves as the political representatives of the farmers, secured
517 the support of much of the cooperative and mutual insurance movements, and
518 efficiently supported their members in the process of modernization. It was not by
519 accident that the foundation of the farmers' unions coincided with the introduction of
520 universal (male) suffrage. On the eve of the First World War, there was already a
521 branch of a farmers' union and a mutual cattle insurance association in every other
522 Belgian municipality, and a *Raiffeisenkas* in one in four. By also uniting rural women
523 and youth, during the inter-war period, the unions gradually created a strong identity
524 as a 'second home' for the whole farming family (Van Molle, 1990).

525 In the Netherlands the unions quickly acquired an anti-liberal character, either
526 strongly Catholic in the provinces of North Brabant and Limburg or strongly
527 Protestant, particularly in Gelderland and the East of the country. Thus Dutch
528 farmers' organizations became involved in the process of ideological pillarization
529 (*verzuiling*). Locally, the competition between Catholic, Protestant and more liberal
530 associations reinforced the degree of organization (Smits, 1996). In Belgium, the
531 establishment of farmers' unions formed a part of the Catholic offensive against
532 liberalism and socialism. The Catholic party's unbroken political ascendancy from
533 1884 to 1914 contributed further to the identification of agriculture and countryside
534 with the Catholic establishment. In this respect the First World War was not a turning
535 point.

536 In the 1920s, the membership of the farmers' unions reached record highs. The
537 *Belgische Boerenbond* (Belgian Farmers' Union), founded in 1890 and the largest

538 union before the war, tended to a virtual monopoly position after the war, but soon
 539 lost ground to new ideologically neutral organizations, especially in Wallonia where
 540 the dominance of Flemish and explicitly Catholic organization was no longer
 541 accepted. During the crisis of the 1930s, a small number of discontented farmers
 542 turned to extreme right-wing politics and formed their own *Parti Agraire Belge* and
 543 *Boerenfront* in Belgium, and the *Nationale Bond Landbouw en Maatschappij* in the
 544 Netherlands. But in both countries the remarkably extensive network of traditional
 545 farmer's unions remained in place, strengthened its position via mergers and
 546 continued to put pressure on the national agricultural policy. Moreover, from the late
 547 nineteenth century onwards, private and state initiatives towards agriculture (in the
 548 field of education for instance) became tightly interwoven, forming together a solid
 549 'agricultural institutional matrix', which remains in place today notwithstanding the
 550 decimation of the agricultural population (Schoorman, 2010).

551 From the 1960s the well-oiled agricultural lobby itself came under pressure.
 552 First from outside, because of the negative effects of the agricultural policy of the
 553 EEC: the production of surpluses at high cost and environmental damage (Kooij,
 554 1999). Secondly, the agricultural lobby faced internal criticisms: increasingly some
 555 rejected the productivist path, as is demonstrated by the formation of alternative
 556 farmers' organizations, the development of organic farming, agricultural tourism and
 557 social care farms, the turn towards traditional regional products and direct sale from
 558 the farm to consumers (Van der Ploeg, 1999; Segers and Van Molle, 2004). But all
 559 this took shape in Belgium and the Netherlands gradually, without major shocks or
 560 social dramas. In order to understand this smooth evolution, it is necessary to point
 561 once again to the powerful driving and protective role of the farmers' unions. After a
 562 long period of stability in the organizational landscape, at the end of the twentieth
 563 century they started to merge both in the Netherlands and Belgium (cf. for instance
 564 the foundation in Wallonia in 2001 of the *Fédération Wallonne de l'Agriculture*). The
 565 result is that farmers nowadays are no longer organized according to the ideological
 566 'pillars', but in large regional associations and according to agricultural specialisation.

567

568 *Peasant resistance*

569 The modern rural Low Countries are not known for either rebellion or disorder. The
 570 fact that small ownership and tenancy were both widespread, and that large properties
 571 were relatively rare, made for a social hierarchy in the countryside which was less

572 questioned than that of Britain. Instead of notable conflicts within the farming
573 population – between proprietors and tenants, or between employers and agricultural
574 workers – Belgium experienced repeated hunger crises in the first half of the
575 nineteenth century which provoked conflicts between those who were able to afford
576 food and those who could not. The last food riot took place as late as 1861. Beside
577 that, there were periodic complaints about high rents, violations of the hunting rights
578 of the landowners and problems with poaching, as described in well-known late
579 nineteenth-century novels of the Flemish naturalist and writer Cyriel Buysse.

580 The absence of serious class conflicts within rural society can also be
581 explained by the fact that, at least in Belgium, the number of agricultural labourers
582 diminished drastically from the 1860s onwards. New job opportunities with higher
583 wages in expanding industries drained the countryside of manpower. In 1880 Belgium
584 counted c.180,000 agricultural workers, in 1910 about 160,000, but in 2000 barely
585 100,000 were left {please check these numbers}. Although their living and working
586 conditions fell far short of those of urban and industrial wage earners, the socialist
587 party did not succeed in its attempts to mobilize them and lost interest in rural affairs.

588 In the Netherlands, the labourers' strike of 1929 in the Oldambt, a region in
589 the province of Groningen where the polarization between farmers and agricultural
590 labourers had grown since the second half of the nineteenth century, is seen as a
591 turning point. Groningen in the north-east and Zeeland in the south-west of the
592 Netherlands are both arable farming regions with relatively many labourers. Against
593 the background of high unemployment amongst them, their union ({Spell out in
594 Dutch?} NVV) called for a strike for higher wages at the beginning of the harvest
595 season. In the end a compromise was reached, but it was a pyrrhic victory for the
596 labour union because the farmers responded by quickening their adoption of labour-
597 saving machinery (Jansma and Schroor, 1987).

598 If collective protests were seldom were made in the nineteenth century about
599 scarcity and high rents, they sometimes burst out in the twentieth-century context of
600 overproduction and falling market prices, and of the growing importance of politics.
601 Farmers learned, from the example of the industrial trade unions, how to put pressure
602 on the government. Spontaneous demonstrations of Belgian farmers took place in
603 1936 because of the low prices for milk and potatoes. In the 1960s and 1970s
604 hundreds of demonstrations were held complaining of low prices and low demand,
605 with or without the approval and support of the farmers' unions, with the violent

606 demonstration against EEC policy in Brussels of around 100,000 angry farmers drawn
607 from all its member states on 23 March 1971 as a notorious high point.

608

609 *The prosperity of the farming community*

610 Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century rural society experienced an increasing social
611 polarization. After 1800 the margins of survival for small farming and income pooling
612 {better phrase?} families narrowed, rents reached historical highs and the income
613 which could be drawn from using commons, village credit networks and cottage
614 industries rapidly declined. Large portions of the rural population could only ensure
615 their survival by an ever deeper exploitation of their family's labour on small parcels
616 of land, in old and new artisan industries (such as clothing and lace making), and
617 itinerant seasonal labour. The rising and falling prosperity of market-oriented farmers
618 ran in parallel with the increasing and decreasing prices for grain and land. Conditions
619 after 1750 generally favoured farmers. The prices for agrarian products rose steeply,
620 especially in the French-Batavian period between 1795-1813, a period of scarcity.
621 After a short period of relatively low prices between 1817 and 1825, profits began to
622 rise again. This is reflected in the material culture of the countryside. Large farmers in
623 particular distinguished themselves with a luxurious lifestyle. Around 1850 farmer's
624 wives in the province of Zeeland wore more golden jewellery than 100 years before;
625 the number of silver watches among farmers increased visibly, and the quality of their
626 household furnishings improved considerably. In the province of Groningen, the
627 houses of the farmers became almost stately homes. Until the end of the 1870s
628 agriculture did very well, although not every region profited equally. The '80s and the
629 first half of the '90s were difficult years, just like the '20s and '30s in the twentieth
630 century. Farm income did not grow again until the 1950s and, although that was a
631 decade of relative prosperity, the standard of living in agriculture lagged far that of
632 other sectors. As a result thousands of labourers and farmers left agriculture, mostly to
633 take work in the growing manufacturing and service sectors. A lot of farmers who left
634 in the 1960s and later were financially compensated: many were able to sell their
635 property at high prices. It is difficult to make general statements on the income of
636 farmers in the last quarter of the twentieth century: fluctuations in time, differences
637 between agricultural sectors and regions, and different degrees of government
638 support, especially from the European Union, played a large role in determining
639 income. {But, could a little more be said?}

640

641 **3. Government and public policies**642 *State policies towards landlords, farmers and peasants*

643 During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the governments of both the Northern
644 and Southern Netherlands had a significant but indirect influence over agriculture:
645 high taxes were imposed on landowners, and especially on the farming families. The
646 primary purpose of the agricultural statistics which were first collected during the
647 period of French dominance, from 1794-95 onwards, was to enable the requisition of
648 corn stocks, whilst the making of a parcel-based land register in all the departments
649 annexed by France from 1807 was primarily meant for tax purposes. During the
650 amalgamation of the north and south under King William I, fiscal pressure on
651 agriculture and food industry increased. The resentment towards taxation in the south
652 was one element in the Belgian complaints against William I, which led to the
653 division of the kingdom in 1830. In other respects both states tried to mediate between
654 the interests of the producers, including the major landowners who had considerable
655 political weight in the still young parliaments, the wholesalers and the mass of
656 consumers. Beside high land taxes, farming families were also hit in an uneven way
657 by conscription because richer families were able to pay for a substitute.

658 The fate of farming communities first appeared on the political agenda when
659 both agriculture and industry were hit by the late nineteenth-century economic crisis
660 and governments feared the appearance of a drifting population of poor and
661 unemployed. The Belgian government opted, instead of agricultural protection, to
662 stimulate modernisation and to lighten the fiscal weight on farming by tax reductions
663 for the acquisition and inheritance of small landed property (laws of 1897, 1900 and
664 1905). The possession of property was seen by the Catholic majority as the most
665 effective way of countering the danger of socialist class struggle. {reaction of the
666 Dutch government?}

667 The occupation of most of Belgium during World War I led to an acute food
668 shortage, decimated the livestock and did a great deal of damage to buildings and
669 farm equipment. But numerous farmers made also good money on the black market.
670 Part of the war profit was creamed off by a special war tax in 1919, while the tax
671 burden placed on landed property was replaced by a progressive income tax that
672 included wages. The farmers and the food market in the Netherlands only experienced
673 the effects of the war indirectly. After the war, the Belgian and Dutch Ministries of

674 Agriculture and the farmers' unions resumed their roles as advocates of agricultural
 675 modernization and defenders of the farming families. Moreover, memories of
 676 shortages and high food prices heightened the appreciation of national agriculture and
 677 the domestic food supply. World War II had comparable consequences for both
 678 countries, including special taxes on war profits.

679 The EEC added a crucial chapter to the history of political interference in the
 680 lives of farming families. The intention in the Treaty of Rome (1957) to protect the
 681 income of millions of farmers was in conflict with other objectives of the same
 682 Treaty, namely the ample supply of good quality food at reasonable prices. The
 683 stabilization of prices and markets turned out to be harder to achieve than had been
 684 hoped, and the farmers themselves were not prepared to simply have theoretically
 685 ideal models for rationalization such as the Mansholt plan (launched in December
 686 1968 by the European Agricultural Commissioner Sicco Mansholt, formerly Dutch
 687 agricultural minister) imposed on them. Hence the massive protests of 1971.

688

689 *Changing governmental attitude towards consolidation and enclosure and public*
 690 *regulation of the countryside and landscape change*

691 In the eighteenth and the first decades of the nineteenth century, the organization of
 692 land reclamation took place primarily at local or regional level, with or without the
 693 encouragement of higher authorities. The growing awareness of food shortage during
 694 the Austrian ascendancy {correct phraseology, dates?} encouraged the government to
 695 introduce compulsory land reclamation into the Southern Netherlands. King William I
 696 encouraged attempts at internal colonization in less densely populated sandy regions –
 697 in particular the reclamation projects at Veenhuizen, Wortel and Merksplas – although
 698 none of these were successful. To increase domestic food supply, in 1847 Belgium
 699 government turned to obligatory reclamation of wasteland and the drainage of
 700 waterlogged areas using public funding, both measures achieving fairly respectable
 701 results. Through the systematic improvement of the road network, efforts were also
 702 made to secure the conveyance of fertiliser and the transportation of crops. In the
 703 Netherlands, the role of the central government was noticeable in the legislation for
 704 the enclosure of common land (cf. *markenwetten* of 1809 and 1837). In the period
 705 1840-70, most remaining common land was divided up.

706 Rural landscapes altered besides in other ways too: increasing rural housing,
 707 industrial expansion and land consolidation. The fear, current since the late nineteenth

708 century, of a rural exodus and social unrest in urban and industrial areas inspired the
709 Belgian government to subsidize the building of new housing in the countryside. In
710 1935 the *Nationale Maatschappij voor de Kleine Landeigendom* (National Society for
711 the Small Property) was founded for that purpose (Dejongh and Van Windekens,
712 2002). This move of housing into rural areas was advanced further by the De Taeye
713 Act (1948). A decade later, measures were taken to facilitate the establishment of
714 industrial parks in the economically-less developed areas of Belgium, with the
715 intention of attracting American and other foreign companies, but at the expense of
716 arable land.

717 In the Netherlands land policy became one of the cornerstones of twentieth-
718 century agricultural policy (Van den Bergh, 2004; Karel, 2005). Additional land was
719 reclaimed in the nineteenth century, notably the Haarlemmermeer in 1840-52.
720 Reclamation continued in the twentieth century with the winning of part of the
721 Southern Sea, which became the IJsselmeer. Especially in the 1950s and 1960s, the
722 countryside was deliberately reorganised for the improvement of agricultural
723 production (Groeneveld, 1985). This was the highpoint of agricultural modernisation.
724 Landholdings were re-arranged, and farmers educated in new business models,
725 technical novelties, accounting methods and the running of efficient households by
726 officials from the state advisory service.

727 Since the 1960s public opinion has become more and more conscious that
728 attempts to modernize agriculture were in conflict with and developing environmental
729 concerns. In 1973 Belgium passed a law on nature conservation, while in 1974 the
730 Dutch government published a document (*Relatienota*) which explicitly championed
731 the importance of landscape and nature (Kooij, 1999). Public interest shifted towards
732 nature conservation, animal welfare, food quality and food security. Agriculture and
733 the countryside are no longer synonymous. The countryside is mainly perceived as a
734 residential and recreational space for non-farmers, while agriculture itself is reduced
735 to a small link in the global agro-industrial food chain.

736

737 *Government and market*

738 Before the mid-eighteenth century the Low Countries had no real agricultural policy:
739 at most, there was an urban food policy, a mercantilist trade policy and a physiocratic
740 reclamation policy. The Southern Netherlands produced small grain surpluses and the
741 Dutch Republic acted as grain broker for the European markets. Because of rising

742 food prices and inspired by Enlightenment ideas about the promotion of the general
743 interest, the Austrian government of the Southern Netherlands started to collect
744 descriptive statistics (grain stocks, price registration {market prices?} and import and
745 export flows), and introduced import and export duties. In doing so, they strove to
746 achieve a proper balance between food production and consumption requirements and
747 a fair price for producers, traders and consumers (Van Dijck, 2009: 305-11). For flax,
748 a crucial source of income for smallholders in Flanders, a thoroughly protectionist
749 approach was taken.

750 Government concerns about maintaining the food supply to both the
751 population and the French armies became more acute from 1806 onwards because of
752 the Napoleonic ‘continental system’. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands wanted
753 to safeguard both the lucrative grain trade and food security. Grain exports slackened
754 and from 1816 imports were permitted, subject to payment of a very low import duty.
755 Following the British and French example, Belgium and the Netherlands introduced
756 sliding scales for duties on the import of bread grains in 1834 and 1835 respectively
757 (Van Dijck, 2008: 341-93).

758 But because of rising tensions in the food market, both countries abruptly
759 abandoned this semi-protectionism in 1845-46. During the crisis of the 1840s, caused
760 both by failed harvests and the collapse of the linen-weaving industry, the Belgian
761 government did not confine itself to lifting duties from imports, but also imposed
762 export restrictions. The structural deficit in domestic grain production made minds in
763 both the Netherlands and Belgium receptive, from the 1850s onwards, to the cause of
764 free trade in an open, competitive market in line with the ideas of classical political
765 economy. The young Belgian state, with its fast-growing group of wage-dependent
766 workers in the coal mines and the iron and textile industries, could not afford food
767 shortages and high food prices, both because it needed to maintain its competitiveness
768 with British industry but also because it feared popular disorder. By the 1870s, the
769 liberalisation of the market in both countries was complete.

770 In Belgium, the *laissez-faire* principle was not an obstacle to government
771 intervention in the fields of research, agricultural education, public works, cattle
772 improvement and efforts to combat cattle diseases. Belgian faith in progress through
773 science and education was particularly striking. The Belgian state started with a
774 veterinary school (1836), fifteen secondary-level agricultural schools (1840s), and the
775 *Institut agricole de l’Etat* (Institute for higher agricultural education, 1860). The state

776 subsidised cattle competitions, agricultural and horticultural exhibitions,
777 demonstrations of agricultural machines, and several hundred lectures and courses
778 every year. With manuals in both French and Dutch, medals, diplomas and prizes, it
779 encouraged farmers to modernize. Also private initiative increased, with the
780 publication of ever more books, farming almanacs and journals. But this was not yet
781 enough to produce effects on a macro-scale (Segers and Hermans, 2009). In the
782 Netherlands however, the role of the central government remained limited.

783 Large-scale grain imports from the 1870s onwards, mainly from North
784 America, and the resulting fall in market prices, quickly gave agricultural policy in
785 both states a new direction. Despite fierce international competition and pressure from
786 interest groups for the introduction of far-reaching protectionism, both countries
787 broadly maintained an open market policy: Belgium in order to safeguard its
788 industrial interests, and the Netherlands in order to preserve its pivotal position as an
789 entrepôt in the in the international food market.

790 Belgium's governments before the First World War went no further than
791 highly selective market intervention. Only a few products were subject to (limited)
792 import duties: oats, livestock and meat, flour and pasta, canned food, dairy products
793 and confectionery. The intention was clear: first the government wanted to keep bread
794 as cheap as possible, secondly, it sought to reorient agriculture towards more lucrative
795 market segments, and thirdly to wished to encourage the food-processing industry.
796 The economic recovery from the 1890s increased the purchasing power of the
797 working classes, which contributed to growing domestic demand for meat, butter,
798 vegetables and fruit. The Netherlands made the same policy choice, eschewing
799 protection and opting for a reorientation of mixed farms towards cattle farming, dairy
800 and market gardening. More than in Belgium, there was a strong export focus. The
801 Netherlands established a prominent position in the international market for butter,
802 cheese and horticultural products. Increasing use was made of artificial fertiliser on
803 farms, and the Netherlands became one of the biggest importers of maize, which was
804 used as a concentrated food for cattle. Controls of finished products were intended to
805 guarantee confidence in Dutch foods.

806 The remarkable expansion in both Belgium and the Netherlands of agricultural
807 research and education from the late nineteenth century onwards should primarily be
808 seen as a response to the agrarian crisis. In the Netherlands, the agricultural school at
809 Wageningen was converted in 1876 into a national institution which became the pivot

810 of Dutch agricultural research and education. Both countries started with influential
811 agricultural research stations which played also an important role in the struggle
812 against the adulteration of fertilizers, cattle feeds and foodstuffs.

813 Paradoxically, the strength of the post-war recovery was the cause of the next
814 crisis. As a result of overproduction and sharp price decreases on a worldwide scale,
815 both agriculture and industry again found themselves in difficulties in the 1930s.
816 Agricultural policy was reactivated in both countries, in a particularly difficult context
817 of governmental crises, monetary instability, budget problems and right-wing
818 extremism. There were again loud calls for protectionism, but neither of these small,
819 export-oriented countries was inclined to take this approach very far. What followed
820 in both was a complex set of measures such as import licences, import quotas, low
821 import duties and a crisis law to reduce the financial pressure on leasehold
822 {leaseholders?}. These measures were intended to have a price-stabilising effect, but
823 met with only limited success. Moreover, the Netherlands and Belgium were working
824 against one another. The Convention of Ouchy, which was held in the summer of
825 1932 and sought to abolish down the tariff barriers between the two countries, was
826 ratified by neither.

827 In 1933, the Dutch parliament passed the Agricultural Crisis Act, which gave
828 the government the power to intervene in production, processing and sales. After the
829 Second World War, the line of a powerful statutory organization of the agricultural
830 sector took further shape in the Agricultural Board (*Landbouwschap*) {meaning, and
831 date?}. A special small farmers' committee was set up in 1936 {by who?}. Support
832 for these farmers was coupled with measures to rationalize their farming activities. In
833 Belgium too, a number of people spoke out in favour of a corporate reorganization of
834 the agricultural sector, but they found few supporters. The Belgian Ministry of
835 Agriculture sought to reactivate the sector in the 1930s by creating instruments {?i.e.
836 government bodies?} to raise agricultural productivity, improve product quality and
837 promote sales.

838 The objectives of post-war Dutch agricultural policy essentially remained the
839 same: higher productivity to ensure domestic supply and a strong export position, plus
840 a good income for the farmers. The government's involvement increased further. In
841 the late 1950s, mechanization, rationalization and economies of scale were
842 recommended as the way forwards to give Dutch family farming a new future. But at
843 the same time, the government abandoned the ideal of maintaining large numbers of

844 less profitable farms. Many small farmers had to leave agriculture. Measured by its
845 own economic targets, this policy was highly successful. Both productivity and
846 incomes rose rapidly, but agrarian employment dropped in both absolute and relative
847 terms (Bieleman, 2010).

848 Belgian agriculture had a hard time after the Second World War contending
849 with the competitive advantage of the Dutch farmers, particularly in the dairy sector
850 and horticulture. For agricultural products the Benelux Customs Agreement of 1944
851 proved problematic. The trade agreement of the BLEU (Belgo-Luxembourg
852 Economic Union) with the Dutch, concluded in 1947, served as a manoeuvre to slow
853 down price harmonization. Yet due to a lack of existing export markets, Belgian
854 agriculture was faced with new problems. With the prospect being able to access an
855 extensive foreign market within the union, Belgium became an important supporter of
856 the EEC. Upsizing, mechanization, intensification and specialization became the
857 watchwords in Belgium too, in combination with the closing down of unrewarding
858 farms which was subsidized by the government from 1965 onwards
859 (*Landbouwsaneringsfonds*).

860 With the Stresa conference of 1958, the EEC common agricultural policy
861 (CAP) was properly launched. The EEC primarily gave Belgian and Dutch agriculture
862 an important boost, as new markets became available. The firm {Q correct – or
863 farm?} policy of Mansholt reinforced the policy line of subsidising and stimulating
864 competitive sectors (Merriënboer, 2006). The EEC developed the market and price
865 policy, with guaranteed minimum prices for the farmers, whereas the member states
866 assumed responsibility for structural policy such as land consolidation.

867 The disadvantages of the European common agricultural policy became
868 apparent in the 1970s. It was very expensive, due in part to monetary instability which
869 involved huge expenditure on MCAs (Monetary Compensatory Amounts) but also the
870 accession of the UK, Ireland and Denmark in 1972. Belgian and Dutch farming faced
871 overproduction, and farmers' incomes often lagged behind those of wage earners in
872 industry and the service sector. The McSharry reform of 1992 launched all aspects of
873 EC agricultural policy. in a new direction. Environmental and animal welfare issues
874 have also been taken more seriously since the 1990s (Silvis, 2008).

875

876 *Peasants and farmers as political force in national politics and their social standing*

877 Belgian historical imagination ascribed farmers a hero's part. The so-called
 878 *Boerenkrijg* (peasants' battle) of 1798 – the revolt of the rural population of the
 879 Southern Netherlands against French conscription, high taxes and persecution of
 880 priests – became the symbol of Belgian romantic nationalism. But whether and to
 881 what extent Belgian farmers were already politized and considered as real 'citizens',
 882 in the perception of the elites before the introduction in 1893 of universal male
 883 suffrage remains unclear. The truth is that the connection between the right to vote
 884 and taxes before 1893 favoured farmers because the ownership of even small parcels
 885 of land could give them the vote, at least at municipal level. This was also the case for
 886 tenants who paid one third of the taxes on the land they leased. The democratic
 887 reforms of 1893 favoured farmers in a further way. The plural voting system
 888 established then (which continued until 192) gave owners of real estate and heads of
 889 households an extra vote.

890 Hence the increasing electoral propaganda aimed at the farming population, as
 891 much by Catholics as Liberals. The countryside became more and more the province
 892 of the Catholic electoral campaigns, what has been labelled by de Smaele (2009) as
 893 'ruralisation' of Belgian Catholicism, whereas the Liberals and later also the
 894 Socialists developed their support chiefly in the urban and industrial parts of Belgium.
 895 The Catholics portrayed farmers as intrinsically religious and faithful to church and
 896 throne, the countryside as the healthiest part of the country and agriculture as the
 897 necessary basis of the national economy, despite the increasing import of bread
 898 grains. Social unrest in industrial cities in the 1880s, the socialist threat, the electoral
 899 reforms of 1893 (universal suffrage) and 1899 (proportional representation) and the
 900 inadequate food supply during World War I, all gave this emotional discourse and the
 901 political efforts in favour of farmers extra boosts. It is important to underline again
 902 that the Catholic farmers' unions played a pivotal role in the political 'housing' of the
 903 peasantry, especially in Flanders and with the *Boerenbond* in front. They succeeded in
 904 being recognized as their political representatives and spokesmen. Farmers
 905 themselves made a rational choice when renewing their membership, often from
 906 generation to generation, because of the advantages (financial and other) it offered
 907 (Van Molle, 1990). The Ministry of Agriculture was headed from 1884 until its
 908 abolition as a federal ministry in 2002, with only minor interruptions, by a Catholic
 909 (later Christian Democrat) minister of Agriculture. In the Netherlands the countryside
 910 voted mainly conservative-liberal (in Groningen and Zeeland) or Christian Democrat

911 (on the sandy soils). With the changing social structure of the countryside since the
912 1960s, this pattern became less solid, but was still dominant until the 1990s. The most
913 famous Dutch minister of agriculture, Sicco Mansholt, however, was a social
914 democrat from Groningen. {Discussion of the Netherlands so far in this section seems
915 v slight and needs expansion. }

916 Political weight does not necessarily equal social respect. Public discourse and
917 collective representations of farmers, agriculture and countryside were often
918 paradoxical, oscillating between distaste for their backwardness, superstitiousness and
919 conservatism, as in the biting naturalist poetry of Emile Verhaeren around 1900, and
920 praise for their innate moral virtues, cultural values and contribution to wealth and
921 welfare. The growing identification of Flemish Catholicism with an anti-urban and
922 anti-industrial discourse formed the breeding-ground for the cultural representation of
923 Flanders as rural and conservative, despite its high degree of urbanization since the
924 Middle Ages and the progressing industrialization from the late nineteenth century
925 onwards. In the Netherlands similar developments could be seen, with as a highpoint
926 the *Vaderlandsch Historisch Volksfeest* (The National Historical Peoples'
927 Celebration) of 1919 in Arnhem which attracted some 400,000 visitors to the recently
928 opened (1918) Dutch open air museum. In the 1950s and 1960s, when Flanders
929 started to develop its own television programmes, it presented itself to the public with
930 films which were based on country novels of Stijn Streuvels, Ernest Claes and Felix
931 Timmermans, and were shot at the open-air museum of Bokrijk which presented itself
932 as a true copy of the Flemish rural past. The Dutch choose as their national symbols
933 tulips and wooden shoes. Since the 1960s, the effects of the CAP and the one
934 dimensional pursuit of higher income via higher productivity have once more set a
935 negative tone, blaming farmers and agriculture for exorbitant expenses,
936 overproduction, environmental damage and questionable food quality. The sector took
937 a long time to come to terms with this criticism. Next to niche markets for biological
938 products, mainstream agriculture also started to pay more attention to landscape
939 preservation, animal welfare, and environmental effects. Recent problems with
940 industrially processed food, for instance. the dioxin crisis in 1999, even gained for the
941 farmers new public respect and praise as hard working producers who were
942 themselves victims of the complex agro-food chain. Traditional production methods
943 and authentic 'produits du terroir' have come into vogue again. The imagined re-

944 invention of farmers and countryside, whether it be in the positive or the negative
945 sense, appears to be fruitful and usable at different times and circumstances.

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